This work presents a descending-price-auction algorithm to obtain the maximum marketclearing price vector (MCP) in unit-demand matching markets with m items by exploiting the combinatorial structure. With a shrewd choice of goods for which the prices are reduced in each step, the algorithm only uses the combinatorial structure, which avoids solving LPs and enjoys a strongly polynomial runtime of O(m 4 ). Critical to the algorithm is determining the set of under-demanded goods for which we reduce the prices simultaneously in each step of the algorithm. This we accomplish by choosing the subset of goods that maximize a skewness function, which makes the bipartite graph series converges to the combinatorial structure at the maximum MCP in O(m 2 ) steps. A graph coloring algorithm is proposed to find the set of goods with the maximal skewness value that yields O(m 4 ) complexity.
Introduction
Online Advertising is an over $70 billion businesswith double-digit growth in consecutive years over a period of many years. Since nearly all of the ads are sold via auction mechanisms, auctionbased algorithm design, which focuses on the online advertising, has become an important class of mechanism design to study. Among all online advertising auctions, the sponsored search auction, also known as a keyword auction, is the one that most captures researchers' attention.
In a typical sponsored search auction, the auctioneer has a set of web slots to sell and every advertiser has different valuations on different web slots. Problems in sponsored search auctions are usually modeled as problems in (cardinal-preference) matching markets, and prices are used to clear the market. The key assumption of sponsored search auctions is that every advertiser shares the identical ordinal preference on web slots. Under this assumption, the celebrated Vickrey-ClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanism [1, 2, 3] , which makes truthful bidding by the advertisers as (weakly) dominant strategies but yields low revenue to the auctioneer, is adopted by some web giants such as Facebook 1 , and is also a robust option in scenarios where the revenue equivalence theorem [4] holds. However, as the revenue equivalence theorem does not hold in multi-good auctions [5] , auctioneers can look for greater expected revenue than the value obtained by VCG mechanism by using even different efficient and market-clearing auction mechanisms. The most popular auction among these mechanisms is the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction employed by Google. Since the GSP is not incentive compatible, its equilibrium behavior needs to be analyzed [5, 6, 7] , and there are some Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) [4] that have greater expected revenue than the expected revenue of the VCG mechanism. It should also be noted that designing (revenue) optimal mechanisms [8] is intractable [9, 10] even in the context of matching markets when there is more than one good. Thus, the possibility of higher expected revenue coupled with the ease of implementing the GSP auction and the intractability of optimal mechanisms has lead to the popularity of the GSP mechanism.
Unlike a decade ago where there were only statically-listed ads, websites now serve a variety of ads simultaneously, including sidebar images, pop-ups, embedded animations, product recommendations, etc. With this in mind, and the growing heterogeneity in both advertisers and consumers, it is clear that the "shared ordinal preference" assumption is untenable in the context of market design. Search engines and ad-serving platforms will be faced with a growing need to implement general unit-demand matching markets [11] , and such market settings are the focus of our work.
We refer to the prices that efficiently allocate the set of goods to the bidders according to their private valuations as a vector of market-clearing prices (MCP). An ascending price auction algorithm that generalizes the English auction was presented by Demange, Gale and Sotomayor [12] . This ascending price algorithm (DGS algorithm) obtains the element-wise minimum MCP, that coincides with the VCG price. DGS is thus incentive compatible yet obtains low expected revenue for the mechanism. Of course, simultaneously maximizing revenue and maintaining incentive compatibility is computationally intractable once we have more than one good for sale, but we should still hope to obtain better than the minimum MCP within efficient mechanisms.
In the present paper we design a family of mechanisms that seek to elicit the maximum MCP from the participants without sacrificing computational efficiency. Here we focus explicitly on how we can efficiently compute the maximum MCP given some representation of the bidder utilities, and defer the general 2 analysis of strategic behavior to future work.
Critical to our paper would be answering whether there exists a strongly polynomial-time al-gorithm to obtain the maximum MCP exactly. Before discussing the literature for the maximum MCP, we discuss the state of the art for the minimum MCP. The intuitively appealing DGS ascending price algorithm that attains the minimum MCP is only weakly polynomial time: the potential function used to show convergence depends on the valuations; and its value decrements by at least a constant independent of the valuations in each step. In fact, it is the well-known strongly polynomial-time Hungarian algorithm [14] for finding the maximum weight matching in a weighted bipartite graph, that yields a strongly polynomial time algorithm for finding the minimum MCP, O(m 4 ) in the original implementation that can then be reduced to O(m 3 ) [15] . This will be the aspirational goal of this work.
Using the method outlined in [16] , where one computes the solution of two linear programs, it is possible to determine the maximum MCP. Note, however, that this is at best a weakly polynomialtime algorithm, and is neither a combinatorial nor an auction algorithm. Given that the DGS ascending price mechanism returns the minimum MCP, it is also intuitive to study descending price mechanisms to obtain the maximum MCP, i.e., generalize the Dutch auction to multiple goods. The first attempt to obtain the maximum MCP through descending price auction is in the work by Mishra and Garg [17] , where they provide a descending-price-based auction algorithm that yields an approximation algorithm. The algorithm doesn't require agents to bid their whole valuation but still yields a price-vector in weakly polynomial-time 3 that is within in l ∞ norm of the maximum MCP 4 . Therefore, in this work, one of main goals is to develop a strongly polynomialtime combinatorial/auction algorithm using descending prices for the exact computation of the maximum MCP. Note that based on the analysis in [18] choosing the maximum MCP in sponsored search markets has exactly the same complexity as the VCG, GSP and Generalized first-price (GFP) mechanisms: The web-slots are sold from best to the worst and in decreasing order of the bids of the agents, with the only difference being the price that's ascribed to each good. Once the computational problem is solved, setting the maximum MCP is a viable option for general unit-demand markets, and is an alternate efficient mechanism.
Our contribution
By judiciously exploiting the combinatorial structure in matching markets, we propose a strongly polynomial-time 5 descending price auction algorithm that obtains the maximum MCPs in time O(m 4 ) with m goods (and bidders). Critical to the algorithm is determining the set of underdemanded goods (to be defined precisely later on) for which we reduce the prices simultaneously in each step of the algorithm. This we accomplish by choosing the subset of goods that maximize a skewness function, which is obtained by proposed graph coloring algorithm a simple combinatorial algorithm to keep updating the bipartite graph and the collection under-demanded goods set. We start by discussing an intuitively appealing algorithm to solve this problem that uses the HopcraftKarp [19] algorithm and Breadth-First-Search (BFS). This procedure will only yield a complexity of O(m 4.5 ). We will then present a refinement that cleverly exploits past computations and the structure of the problem to reduce the complexity to O(m 4 ). same cardinality. A perfect matching in a balanced bipartite graph G = (M, B, E) is a subset of edges E pm ⊆ E such that every vertex in G is incident upon exactly one edge of the matching. We denote the neighbors of a set of vertices S by N (S), where N (S) {j ∈ B : ∃i ∈ S s.t. (i, j) ∈ E} when S ⊆ M and N (S) {j ∈ M : ∃i ∈ S s.t. (j, i) ∈ E} when S ⊆ B.
More precisely, we call S a constricted good set if S ⊂ M or a constricted buyer set if S ⊂ B.
Theorem (Hall's marriage theorem [20] ). For a balanced bipartite graph G = (M, B, E), G contains no perfect matching if and only if G contains a constricted set.
Matching Market
We consider a matching market with a set B of buyers, and a set M heterogeneous merchandise with exactly one copy of each type of good. Each buyer i ∈ B has a non-negative valuation v ij ≥ 0 for good j ∈ M , and desires at most one good (e.g. they are unit-demand buyers). We denote the |B| × |M| valuation matrix by V. Our assumption that |B| = |M| = m is without loss of generality because we can always add dummy goods or dummy buyers for balance.
Given a price vector P = [P 1 P 2 ... P m ], we assume a quasi-linear utilities for the buyers, i.e., buyer i receiving good j has utility U i,j = v i,j − P j . Since each buyer is unit-demand, we define U * i be the maximum (non-negative) payoff of buyer i ∈ B, i.e., U * i = max 0, max
buyers can opt out of the market and obtain zero, we insist on the payoff being non-negative.
Definition 2. Under a price vector P, the preferred-good set of buyer i ∈ B is a set of goods
Note that the preferred goods set of a buyer is empty if its payoff for all the goods is negative. Definition 3. By connecting each buyer with its preferred goods and recalling the assumption of |M | = |B|, we can construct a balanced bipartite graph which we call the preference graph, i.e., G pref = (M, B, E pref ) where E pref = {(j, i) : i ∈ B and j ∈ L i }.
To avoid any confusion, we always place goods on the left-hand side and buyers on the right-hand side of the preference graphs.
Definition 4. The set of goods M is over-demanded in G pref if it's a union of preferred-good sets of a set of buyers B, where |B| > |M |. Given a particular preference graph G pref that doesn't contain a perfect matching and a constricted buyer set B, an over-demanded set of goods coincides with the neighbor set of B, i.e., N (B), where the neighbor set is determined in G pref . Similarly, the under-demanded set of goods M coincides with a constricted good set.
Given a specific price vector, if the preference graph G pref contains a perfect matching E pm ⊆ E pref , then we can allocate to each buyer exactly one of the goods it prefers and also sell all the goods. A price vector that leads to a perfect matching in the realized preference graph is called a market-clearing price (MCP) (also called a Walrasian price).
Given any valuation V , it is well known that the set of MCPs is non-empty and bounded [22] . Boundedness is obvious from the finiteness of the valuations. Non-emptiness is established either using the characterization in [22] , using a constructive ascending price algorithm [12] that starts from all the prices being 0, or by using the VCG mechanism price (see Chap 15 in [31] ). Furthermore, the set of MCPs has a lattice structure [22] , so that given any two different MCP vectors, the element-wise maximum of the vectors and the element-wise minimum of the vectors are also MCPs. This guarantees the existence of the maximum and the minimum MCPs.
Complexity of Algorithms An algorithm runs in strongly polynomial time if the number of operations and the space used are bounded by a polynomial in the number of input parameters, i.e., O(polynomial of |M |), but both do not depend on the size of the parameters (assuming unit time for basic mathematical operations). If this does not hold but the number of operations is still bounded by a polynomial in the number of input parameters where the coefficients depend on the size of the parameters, then we say that the algorithm runs in weakly polynomial time.
Design of Descending Price Algorithm
The problem considered in our work, as mentioned earlier, is to find the generalization of the Dutch auction 6 to matching markets. Specifically, we seek a descending price auction that always converges to the maximum MCP. Like the DGS mechanism, our mechanism will choose a particular constricted good set to ensure the convergence. Specifically, we will define a dual to the "minimal over-demanded set" which we call the maximally skewed set. Unlike minimal over-demanded sets, the maximally skewed set is unique, and an example of failure to achieve the maximum MCP if this set is not chosen will be discussed in Section B.1.
Framework of Descending Price Algorithms
We design a descending auction, which is the analogue of the ascending auction, in a straightforward framework. We start from a high enough initial price, iteratively pick a constricted good set to decrement prices, and terminate the algorithm when there exists a perfect matching. Clearly, this framework does not guarantee the termination in finite time, let alone strongly polynomial time. In order to make the algorithm run in strongly polynomial time, we will exploit the combinatorial structure of the preference graph, and make the evolution of the preference graph in the run of the algorithm be such that any specific bipartite graph appears at most once. To achieve this goal, we will specify a particular initial configuration, and a particular price reduction to be carried out in each step of the algorithm.
Initial Price Choice: A perfect matching requires every good be preferred by some buyers. Then a reasonable starting point should guarantee that the preferred-buyer set of every good is non-empty, otherwise it cannot be an MCP for any valuation matrix. Thus, the natural candidate for the initial price is P j = max i∈M v i,j for good j, which is (element-wise) greater than or equal to any MCP but ensures that every good is preferred by at least one buyer from the very outset.
Price Reduction: In computing the price reduction for a given constricted set S, we need to reduce the price by a large enough amount to trigger a change in the preference graph (otherwise we still have a constricting set and the same set of goods can be chosen again), but we should also avoid reducing the price of any good below its price in the maximum MCP. In other words, we want to find the minimum value to compensate the buyers not in the N (S) to make at least one buyer indifferent between one of the goods in S and the good(s) she prefers initially; the buyer in question may have an empty preferred goods set, in which case it is sufficient to ensure that one of the goods in S has a non-negative utility with the price reduction. Lemma 1 formally states the price reduction to be used in the proposed family of descending price algorithms. Figure 1 : Criteria for choosing constricted good sets Lemma 1. Given a constricted good set S and a price vector P, the minimum price reduction of all goods in this set S guaranteeing to add at least a new buyer to the set N (S) is
LL LR RL RR
(1)
Choice of Constricted Good Sets and The Skewness Function
Since different choices of constricted good sets could generate different MCPs when the algorithm terminates, pinpointing the right constricted good sets iteratively has a pivotal role when designing the algorithm for finding the maximum MCP 7 . Before detailing the selection criterion, we use Figure 1 to provide some quick intuition. On one hand, we prefer choosing the constricted good set in LL to LR because we want to choose the largest good set given the same set of neighbors (buyers). On the other hand, we prefer RL to RR because we do not include any subgraph (set of good-buyer pairs) that already has a perfect matching. With this intuition in mind, we present the following formal criteria for choosing constricted-good sets:
1. Pick the constricted goods sets S with the largest difference |S| − |N (S)|. The first criterion ensures that at each step the algorithm (simultaneously) reduces the price of the most critical set of goods. The proof that our algorithm returns the maximum MCP will not hold without this property. As an added bonus it also positively impacts the speed of convergence. The second criterion excludes any subset of goods S ⊂ S which is already perfectly matched to a subset of buyers, i.e., |N (S ) \ N (S)| ≥ |S |. Jointly the criteria imply that we are searching for the most "skewed" constricted good set in the preference graph. To formulate this mathematically, we define a function to measure the skewness of a set. With this skewness function, the criteria described earlier are equivalent to choosing the constricted goods set with the maximal skewness. To formally make this statement we need to show two properties. The first one is the uniqueness of the maximally skewed set when the preference graph has no perfect matching; and the second one is that the maximally skewed set is a constricted goods set when the preference graph has no perfect matching. Lemma 2 proves these.
Lemma 2. Given a bipartite graph with no perfect matching, the maximally skewed set is unique and coincides with the constricted goods set with the maximal skewness.
With Lemma 2 in place, it easily follows that the two rules we imposed are equivalent to finding the maximally skewed set at every iteration (as we already know that a perfect matching doesn't exist). With the proper initial price vector choice, specified price reduction per round, and the unique choice of the maximally skewed set, the complete algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
Note that the DGS algorithm, which searches for over-demanded sets to increase the price, has a dual structure to our algorithm. Thus, it is not surprising that the minimally over-demanded sets of items in the DGS algorithm, denoted as DGS sets below, have a relationship with the skewness function f (·). They are ones that obtain the minimum positive value of the function |N (S)| − |S| − 1 |N (S)| when the algorithm starts with initial price 0. We highlight the fact that the DGS sets may not be unique as there can be multiple sets of goods that yield the same minimum positive value for the function |N (S)| − |S| − 1 |N (S)| . In contrast to our algorithm, the lack of uniqueness in the DGS algorithm is not as critical because different choices of DGS sets lead to the same minimum MCP. Understanding this contrast better is for future work.
Algorithm 1 Skewed-set Aided Descending Price Auction
Input: A |B| × |M| valuation matrix V. Output: MCP P.
1: Initialization, set the price of good j, P j = max i∈B v i,j . 2: Construct the preference graph. 3: while There exists a constricted good set do
4:
Find the maximally skewed set S.
5:
For all j ∈ S, reduce P j by min i∈B\N (S),l∈S {max k∈M\S
Construct the preference graph. 7: end while 8: Return P.
Price Attained, Convergence Rate, and Complexity
First, we demonstrate that the proposed skewed-set aided descending price auction algorithm returns the maximum MCP. We achieve this by performing a check by adding a fictitious dummy good to the preference bipartite graph at termination. Second, we use the potential function to prove the finite time convergence of the algorithm. Finally, we analyze the complexity of the algorithm by presenting algorithms to find the maximally skewed set.
Attaining Maximum Market-Clearing Price
In advance of analyzing the relationship between the skew-aided algorithm and the maximum MCPs, we have to precisely characterize the extremal nature of the maximum MCP. Wearing an optimization hat and using the idea of feasible directions, one would expect that checking whether the MCP of any good can be increased or not is straightforward 8 . However, this logic misses the underlying matching problem and the Marriage theorem. Additionally, since the skewed-set aided algorithm is built on the combinatorial structure of the problem, to bridge the maximum MCP to our algorithm requires a combinatorial characterization of the maximum MCP. The combinatorial characterization requires adding a fictitious dummy good to preserve the property. Hence, we have to provide the following definition before stating the variational and combinatorial characterizations of the maximum MCP in Theorem 1.
be the neighbor set of the buyer set B after adding a dummy good-a good for which every buyer has value 0. If the graph G is clear from the context, we will also simplify the notation further to N D (B) after adding a dummy good. Theorem 1. An MCP P * is the maximum if and only if for any subset of goods, increasing the price of all goods in the set will change the preference graph such that no perfect matching exists. Equivalently, by adding a dummy good, P * is the maximum if and only if any subset of buyers B has a cardinality strictly less than the cardinality of the set of buyers' neighbors N D (B).
For further clarification, any buyer who has zero surplus at the maximum MCP (by definition of the maximum there will exist at least one such buyer) will be indifferent between the matched good and the dummy good. Hence, for every buyer set B containing a zero-surplus buyer, the dummy good D will be in the neighbor set of this set, D ∈ N D (B). We also show a dual property to VCG prices of the maximum MCP in Section ??.
With Theorem 1 in hand, we will now establish the correctness of the algorithm, assuming that it halts (in finite-time). Since the skew-aided algorithm continually changes the preference graph, it is necessary to label the bipartite graph in each round of our algorithm before starting any analysis. Let G 0 be the initial bipartite graph, in the running of our algorithm, we obtain a bipartite graph G t at t th round. Then, we'll need to check whether the terminal condition holds. To avoid cumbersome notation, we will use
. With Theorem 1, the proof of Theorem 2 followings by checking that the preference graphs at termination coincides has the combinatorial characterization outlined above.
Theorem 2. The skewed-set aided descending-price algorithm always returns the maximum MCP.
Preference Graphs Converge Quadratically in the Number of Goods
The Algorithm 1 changes the preference graph in each round to obtain the bipartite graph with combinatorial structure of MCP at termination. We will now show that the algorithm terminates in at most m 2 rounds.
Given a specific preference graph G, we can define the skewness of the graph W (G) to equal the skewness of the maximally skewed set. Therefore, by defining a sequence W (G t ) = max S∈M,S =∅ f t (S), where G t is the preference graph obtained at the t th iteration of Algorithm 1, we show the convergence of the algorithm in finite rounds by proving that W (G t ) strictly decreases with the decrease at least some positive constant. Thus, W (·) is a potential function that will be shown to strictly decrease in every iteration of the algorithm in the proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. For any unit demand matching market with m > 1 the sequence {W (G t )} t≥0 of the skewness value of the maximally skewed set in each round of Algorithm 1 is strictly decreasing with minimum decrement
Given the minimum decrement in Lemma 3, it is straightforward that the preference graphs converge to the bipartite graph with combinatorial structure of MCP in time upper bounded by m 3 because W (G) < m. However, as there are only m 2 positive distinct feasible values of W (G) 9 , we are ensured convergence in time at most m 2 .
Complexity of the Algorithm
Based on the results thus far determining the complexity of our algorithm depends only on the run-time of finding the maximally skewed set. We now discuss two approaches for this.
Algorithm design in search of the maximally skewed set
Given the uniqueness, we can always perform a brute-force search to get the maximally skewed set. Since there are 2 m − 1 non-empty subsets of M, the complexity is O(2 m ), which doesn't meet our goal. We will exploit the combinatorial structure of the preference graph to scale down the complexity of finding the maximally skewed set. For this we design a graph coloring algorithm to color the preference graphs in Algorithm 2.
Definition 7.
A colored preference graph G(M, B, E) is an undirected graph that colors each vertex (goods and buyers) in three colors either red, green, or blue; and each edge is colored red or blue. Denote X c , X = {M, B}, c = {r, g, b} to be the set of goods/buyers colored red, green or blue. E gb rb denotes edges connecting goods in M g ∪ M b and buyers in B r ∪ B b .
In any colored preference graphs, we want red edges to represent edges connecting matched pairs of good-buyer in a maximum matching, and blue edges to represent the rest of the edges. Hence, each vertex has at most one red edge. Additionally, we want the set of red goods M r to represent the set of goods not in the maximally skewed set, the set of blue goods M b to be goods in the maximally skewed set but ones that do not have matched pairs to buyers in this maximum matching (because of the nature of constricted good set), and the set of green goods M g are the rest of the goods. On the buyer side, the buyers that are neighbors of the maximally skewed set should be colored green, the buyers that are not the neighbors of the maximally skewed set but have a matched good should be colored red, and the rest of the buyers should be colored blue. Given the object we seek, we now present an algorithm to color vertices/edges properly in strongly polynomial-time complexity. The steps will include an initial coloring and followed by an update of the preference graph.
Before detailing the initial coloring, we define various depth-first search and breadth-first search procedures relevant to the algorithm.
is a depth-first search (DFS) only using red edges from M to B and only using blue edges from B to M. Similarly, a br-BFS in G(M, B, E) is a breadth-first search (BFS) only using blue edges from M to B and only using red edges from B to M. The set of nodes obtained at the end of the procedure will be called the reachable set Rch(·).
Initial Coloring First, we find a maximum matching using the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm and color edges linked matched pairs red, and other edges blue. After that, we start from the set of good without matched buyer in this maximum matching, color them blue, run the br-BFS algorithm starting from the set of blue goods. When the br-BFS algorithm terminates, color the set of reachable goods Rch(M b ) ∩ M with matched buyers green, color the rest set of goods red. Then, color the matched buyers of red goods red, color the buyers in the Rch(M b ) ∩ B green (they are the neighbors of the most skewed set), and color the rest of buyer blue. Finally, the following lemma states that we get the maximally skewed set from the initial coloring. Given that the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm has complexity O(m 2.5 ) and the br-BFS has complexity upper-bounded by O(m 2 ), we learn the initial coloring has the complexity O(m 2.5 ). Note that the initial coloring does not rely on the initial price, our first algorithm, say initial coloring based decreasing price auction, will use this in every iteration to get the maximally skewed set. This algorithm has complexity O(m 2 × m 2.5 ) = O(m 4.5 ), which is already strongly polynomial.
Lemma 5. Given a bipartite graph with no perfect matching, initial coloring returns the maximally skewed set of this bipartite graph in a strongly polynomial run time of O(m 2.5 ).
Update the preference graph We further scale down the complexity of the initial coloring based decreasing price auction algorithm by exploiting and updating the colored preference graph colored in previous round without completely coloring the whole graph. This is detailed in Algorithm 2. Since the procedure in Algorithm 2 is elaborate, we will highlight some facts of perfect matching and give the sketch of how we use them in the Algorithm 2.
First, we know that if there is a perfect matching, no vertex should be colored blue otherwise we fail to get a maximum matching. Furthermore, the following Lemma 6 states that we will never need to change a vertex from red or green to blue.
Lemma 6. If we have to change the color of a vertex from red or green to blue based on interpretation given to the colors, one of the following is true: a) The coloring of previous preference graph is incorrect; b) The price reduction is not optimal; c) One of the updates from the previous preference graph to current graph is wrong.
Given the property of a proper coloring stated in Lemma 6, we know that the set of blue buyers in round t, denoted as B t b , is a decreasing set. Therefore, the key idea of designing Algorithm 2 is to restrict operations irrelevant to reducing the set of blue buyers to some constant number of O(m 2 ) operations, and to allow the complexity of operations reducing the set of blue buyers to be upper-bounded by O(m 3 ). To achieve this, we observe that the set of buyers at round t that are willing to get goods in previous maximally skewed set, denoted by A t , only contains red and blue buyers, i.e., A t ⊆ B t r ∪ B t b . Then, we know that if A t ⊆ B r and we cannot reach any blue buyers from A t without passing green or blue goods, then the current matching is maximized, and all we need to do for updating colors is to run rb-BFS from the set of M b with complexity O(m 2 ) as we did in initial coloring. In other cases, we need to find the new maximum matching with number of matched pairs increased by at least 1, which can be achieved by at least O(m 2.5 ) using the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm, and at least one blue buyer will be recolored. Since the maximum number of matched pairs is m, the complexity of the whole algorithm attaining the maximum MCP will be upper-bounded by the {(complexity of updating process not recoloring blue buyers)+(complexity of computing price reduction)}× (convergence rate of the preference graph)+(complexity of updating process increasing maximum matched pairs)× (maximum number of blue buyers
Theorem 3. The skewed-aided descending price algorithm has a strongly polynomial run time of O(m 4 ) by using Algorithm 2 to search the maximally skewed set.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed a descending price algorithm in search of sets of the maximum MCPs by exploiting the combinatorial structure of bipartite graphs in matching markets. The algorithm terminates in at most m 2 rounds for any non-negative valuation matrix with runtime O(m 4 ). There are three main avenues for future work. First, we would like to determine whether one can reduce the complexity further to O(m 3 ) mirroring the Hungarian algorithm. Second, as incentive compatibility does not hold with the maximum MCP, we would like to determine the equilibrium bidding strategy in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium given the proposed mechanism. This will be necessary for expected revenue computation, and for a comparisons with the VCG mechanism, GSP and laddered auction proposed in [36, 37] , and also other mechanisms such as the GFP auction. Finally, many real-world applications of matching markets outside of the online advertising setting are not unit-demand [38] ,and obtaining a combinatorial version of the descending price auction returning the maximum MCP is a challenging open problem for future work.
A Appendix-Details of Algorithms
Algorithm 2 Algorithm in search of the maximally skewed set by coloring preference graph Input: A colored preference graph, a set of buyers A would be added to the neighbor of the previous maximally skewed set Output: An updated colored preference graph 1: if Input preference graph is not colored then
2:
Run the algorithm for initial coloring 3: else
4:
Update the colored preference graph by removing all edges connecting red goods and green buyers and adding corresponding blue edges connecting goods and buyers in A if |N (a) ∩ M b | > 1 then
8:
Pick arbitrary x ∈ {N (a) ∩ M b }, color (a, x) ∈ E red and color a, x green.
9:
else if |{N (a) ∩ M b }| = 1 then
10:
Let x be the unique good in {N (a) ∩ M b }, color (a, x) ∈ E red and color a, x green.
11:
if {N (a) ∩ M g } = ∅ then
12:
Run the rb-DFS starting from 
18:
Color a, x green and switch the color of every edge used in a path from a to x.
19:

Start a br-BFS from
M b in G(M g ∪ M b , B g , E gb g ) to get Rch(M b ).
20:
Color every vertex in {M g ∪ B g } \ Rch(M b ) red 21: end if
22:
Remove a from A
23:
end while
24:
Run the br-BFS starting from {M g } in G(M, B, E) to get a reachable set Rch(S * ) 
Pick a ∈ Rch(S * ) ∩ B b and run rb-DFS starting from a to get Rch(a) 30: if ∃x ∈ Rch(a), x ∈ M b then
31:
Color a, x green; switch the color of every edge used in a path from a to x 32: 
Importance of Maximally Skewed Set
To highlight the importance of choosing the maximally skewed set in our algorithm, we are starting to ask a natural question: if we run the algorithm twice but choose different constricted good sets at some iterations such that the preference graph produced in every round of these two executions are the same, will we get the same MCP vector?
Unfortunately, the answer is no. The choice of the same initial price vector, the same price reduction rule, and the emergence of the same bipartite graph in every round are not enough to guarantee the same returned MCPs. A counterexample is provided in Fig. 2 . In Fig. 2 , the bipartite graphs A-1, B-1 have the same preference graph. Though the chosen constricted good sets in A, B are different, they add the same buyer to the constricted graph. Therefore, the preference graphs in A-2, B-2 are still the same. However, the updated price vector of A-2, B-2 must be different. If A, B choose the same constricted goods set in every round, the returned sets of MCPs of A, B must be different. This example shows that just the bipartite graphs in every round cannot uniquely determine the MCP vector obtained at the termination of the algorithm.
Then, we state a stronger claim in Lemma 7 that if an algorithm wants to get the maximum MCP, the law of choosing the constricted good set must pick the maximally skewed set at the round before termination.
Lemma 7. Given a descending price algorithm with a specific law of choosing the constricted good set, and assuming this algorithm terminates at round T V when giving valuation matrix V m, if this law may not pick the most skewed set at round T V − 1, this algorithm not always return the maximum MCP.
However, if a law of choosing the constricted good set pick the maximally skewed on in the last round before termination, the answer of whether it returns the maximum MCP will be case by case. Since Fig. 2 provide an example of not achieving the maximum MCP, we now provide an example which still gets the maximum MCP in Fig. 4 . In Fig. 4 , the algorithm in upper flow runs the algorithm we proposed and choose maximally skewed set in each round. We pick {A, B} in the first iteration and then pick {A, B, C} in the second iteration; and the algorithm terminates at P = [1, 1, 2]. The algorithm in lower flow does not choose the maximally skewed set in the first round, but the algorithm is forced to choose the maximally skewed set in the second round because it is the only constricted good set. It picked {A, B, C} and lower the price to [2, 2, 2]; and pick {A, B} to get a MCP at [1, 1, 2] . As shown in the figure, these two algorithm both return the maximal MCP. Therefore, the space of sets we can choose which guaranteeing to get the maximum MCP is still an open problem.
B.2 Interpretation of the Maximum MCP Using Buyers' Externalities,
Since the minimum posted price derived from DGS algorithm corresponds to the personalized VCG price given by the Clarke pivot rule [2] , it is not surprising that there is an analogous structure between the posted price and the personalized price also for the maximum MCP. The Clarke pivot rule determines the VCG payment of buyer i using the externality that a buyer imposes on the others by her/his presence, i.e., payment of buyer i = (social welfare 10 of others if buyer i were absent) -(social welfare of others when buyer i is present). Using the combinatorial characterization of the maximum MCP, we obtain an exact analogue of the Clarke pivot rule when viewing the maximum MCP as the personalized price in Theorem 4. In the theorem below we can use any perfect matching to determine the good matched to buyer i.
Theorem 4.
Under the maximum MCP, the price that buyer i pays is (social welfare of the current market adding a duplicate pair of buyer i and its matched good) -(social welfare of the current market adding a duplicate buyer i). This price is the same as the decrease in social welfare that results by removing the good matched to buyer i.
C Appendix-Preliminary Analysis of Strategic Buyers and Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium
As mentioned in the introduction, the proposed descending price algorithm is not incentive compatible so that we need to explore Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) to predict buyers' strategic behaviors. From the messaging viewpoint we will assume that we have a direct mechanism where the buyers bid their valuation: a scalar in sponsored search markets, and a vector in the general matching market. Algorithm 1 is then applied as a black-box to the inputs to produce a price on each good and a perfect matching. Although the strategic behavior of buyers is not the main subject of this work, with expected revenue being an important concern, we provide an instance achieving higher expected revenue than VCG mechanism in a BNE with asymmetric distributions of buyers' valuations. Furthermore, we analyze the BNE in two simple cases with symmetric buyers and the associated bidding strategy of the buyers.
C.1 An Instance Achieving higher expected revenue than VCG
Given the proposed algorithm, it is important to check if there exists a scenario that our algorithm can achieve a higher revenue than the VCG mechanism. It is well-known that the revenue equivalence theorem holds with an assumption that valuation of every player is drawn from a pathconnected space in Chap. 9.6.3 of [39] 11 . Furthermore, there's a large body of literature that has discussed the failure of getting the VCG revenue under asymmetric distribution of buyers' valuations, e.g., see [40] . With this knowledge, we demonstrate a 3 × 3 matching market where our mechanism achieves higher than VCG revenue, where the buyers have asymmetric distributions of their valuations. Consider three advertisers named Alice, Bob, and Carol, and three different types of ads called listing ads, sidebar ads, and pop-ups. The realized valuation is only known to the advertiser (equivalently buyer), but the distribution of an advertisers' valuation is known to other advertisers but not the auctioneer. In other words, the auctioneer can only calculate the price according to the bids submitted by the advertisers. The minimum increment of the submitted bids is , which is a positive infinitesimal, and the valuation matrix of advertisers is displayed in Table 1 . Now, we give an asymmetric BNE 12 in this matching market and provide a detailed verification in the Appendix D.11. First, consider Alice always bids 0 on sidebar ads and pop-ups, and bids max{1 − , w 2 } on listing ads. The best response of Bob is to bid 0 on both sidebar ads and pop-ups, and to bid max{1, x−0.5 2 } on listing ads for any realized x. Now, given Bob's bidding function as above, one of Alice's best responses is to follow her original bidding function. Last, consider the bidding function of Alice and Bob mentioned above, a best response of Carol is to bid 0 on listing ads and pop-ups, and to bid on sidebar ads regardless of the outcomes of y and z. 13 , even if y > z. This is because Carol will never win listing ads for any bids less than 1 as the probability Pr{y − z ≥ 1} = 0. Now, given Carol's bidding strategy, Alice and Bob will not change their bidding functions. Therefore, the strategy {β Alice (w, 0, 0), β Bob (x, 0, 0.5), β Carol (y, z, 2)} = {(max{1 − , With the asymmetric BNE in hand, we want to calculate the expected revenue of the auctioneers and compare it with the expected revenue of the VCG mechanism. Since Carol always wins the sidebar ads and both Alice and Bob bid 0 on that, Carol will pay . Additionally, in the asymmetric BNE, Alice and Bob compete on the listing ads and both bid 0 on sidebar ads and pop-ups, resulting in the payment of listing ads to be the same as the payment in the first price auction. Next, let's calculate the expected revenue of auctioneers, which is given by 
The last step is to calculate the expected revenue of the VCG mechanism, which is given by 
Even if we set to 0, it is obvious that the expected revenue derived under our descending price auction algorithm is strictly greater than the expected revenue of the VCG mechanism. This shows that in some instances the proposed descending price algorithm is preferred to the (DGS) ascending price algorithm, even taking the strategic behavior of buyers into account.
C.2 Symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in 2 × 2 Sponsored Search Market
Now we focus on the analysis of symmetric distributions of buyers. Next we will detail the analysis of two cases for a market with two goods and two buyers, one in the following paragraphs and another one in the next subsection.
Since the primary application of our algorithm is in online advertising auctions, it is useful for us to analyze the strategic behavior under the conventional assumptions made in the sponsored search market setting. The sponsored search market assumes every buyer's (advertiser's) value on goods (web slots) can be determined by a product of the buyer's private weight and a common click-through rate. Now, we consider a 2 × 2 case in sponsored search market with settings detailed below. 12 There need not be a unique equilibrium. 13 The is designed to avoid complex tie-breaking rules.
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There are two web slots with click-through rates c 1 and c 2 , with c 1 ≥ c 2 , and two advertisers with private weights w 1 , w 2 . We assume that w j is an i.i.d. non-negative random variable with PDF f w j (·), and the private value for getting web slots j is w i c j . Each advertiser knows his/her true weight but only knows the distribution of another advertiser's value, and both know that it is a sponsored search market. Under our descending price auction algorithm, they each have to effectively place a one-dimensional bid, denoted by b i , according to their bidding function β j (w j , f w −j (·)), where −j denotes the other advertiser(s). To simplify the analysis, we assume weights w 1 , w 2 are uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Extensions to other symmetric distributions, asymmetric distribution/knowledge space and more web slots are all for future work.
C.2.1 Payment of advertisers
If c 2 = 0, the descending price algorithm terminates at the initial point. At this point, the advertiser j wins the first web slots pays c 1 w j and another advertiser pays 0. This is, equivalent, to the single good case, which has been carefully studied before. When c 2 = 0, the descending price algorithm makes the advertiser indifferent between two slots if he/she bid truthfully. Therefore, if advertiser i wins the first slot, the payment will be (c 1 − c 2 )b i + c 2 b −i , if he/she gets the second slot, the payment will be c 2 b i .
C.2.2 Analysis of strategic behavior
Before deriving the bidding function, we show that the bidding function is a monotonic increasing function of the weight. Since the outcome of this auction is exactly the same as what the VCG mechanism provides, this monotonicity leads us to expect revenue equivalence to hold in this case. Exploring the generality of this result is for future work. This monotonicity property of bidding functions can be generalized to all sponsored search markets when every advertiser's private weight follows the same uniform distributions. Corollary 1. In sponsored search markets with a symmetric uniform distribution of every advertiser's weight, the bidding function is monotonic and the allocation is always efficient.
Proof. See Appendix D.13.
Without loss of generality, we now derive the bidding function of advertiser 1. Since the optimal bidding function is monotonic in the private value, the surplus function of advertiser 1 can be written using an integral form. Advertiser 1 wants to maximize the following surplus function 14 :
With detailed analysis presented in Appendix ??, the bidding function β 1 (w 1 ) is
In this two advertisers case, for advertiser 1, fw −1 (·) = f (w2)(·) and β−1(·) = β2(·).
Without loss of generality, we can let c 1 = 1 and c 2 ∈ [0, 1], Figure 4 displays the optimal bidding bid corresponds to the buyer's private weight and the ratio of click-through rates. 
otherwise It is well known that in the VCG mechanism, the expected VCG revenue is c 1 − c 2 3 . Therefore, in this 2 × 2 case, the proposed algorithm has the same expected revenue as the VCG mechanism after taking the strategic behavior into consideration.
C.3 Symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in 2×2 General Unit-demand Matching Markets
Theoretically, the same method we used to studied the 2 × 2 case of a sponsored search market can be used to solve the 2 × 2 case for a general matching market when valuations are assumed to be i.i.d.. However, that method requires us to consider two variables simultaneously, and we cannot avoid solving the resulting partial differential equations. Hence, before directly solving the general 2 × 2 cases, we present the following lemmas to simplify the analysis afterward.
Lemma 9. In a general 2 × 2 matching market, any strategy placing non-zero bids on both goods is a weakly-dominated strategy of a rational buyer with non-zero valuation on goods.
Proof. Please see Appendix D.14.
Lemma 10. If v i1 > v i2 , any bidding strategy of buyer i with b i1 < b i2 is a weakly dominated strategy.
Proof. Please see Appendix D.15.
With the above two lemmas, the following corollary is straightforward.
Corollary 2. Consider a rational buyer i, any bidding strategy putting non-zero bid on the good with private value lower than another good is a weakly-dominated strategy.
Now, we can get rid of all weakly-dominated strategies to analyze the buyer's strategic behavior to find a symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. It is worth to note that weakly-dominated strategies can still be rationalizable strategies, our approach (analyzing Bayesian Nash equilibrium(BNE) without taking weakly-dominated strategies into consideration) may miss some BNEs. Our current goal is not to find all BNEs but just one. Therefore, we can continue to find a BNE with restricted strategy space.
First, assume v i1 ≥ v i2 without loss of generality, a rational buyer i will bid 0 on the good 2, and bid no more than v 11 − v 12 on good 1. Then, we can compute the equilibrium in symmetric bidding strategies. Assume the symmetric bidding function is β(·, ·) for the good with higher value and 0 for the other one, buyer i bids b on good 1 and the CDF of buyer −i's valuation on good j is F −ij (·), the objective function is
where β denotes β(v −i1 , v −i2 ). Now, we need Lemma 11 to simplify our analysis.
Lemma 11. Denote v ih to be the buyer i's value of the good that has higher value and v il be the buyer i's value of good that has lower value, an optimal bidding function of the higher good
Proof. Please see Appendix D.16.
With Lemma 11, we can revise and simplify the bidding function β(v ih , v il ) to be β r (v ih − v il ). Define the joint CDF of v −i1 − v −i2 to be F −i (·). Then the expected surplus of buyer i for a specific bid b of good 1 is:
Therefore, determining the objective function is equivalent to solving the following optimization problem:
To simplify our problem, let's assume the distributions of private value on goods of two buyers are i.i.d. uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Then assume that the bidding function is differentiable and denote x = v i1 − v i2 . Using the same technique we used to solve the symmetric BNE in sponsored search market. With the analysis in Appendix ??, the bidding function β r (x) is
Then, the expected revenue is
Finally, computing the expected revenue with VCG price yields:
It is shown here that the revenue equivalence theorem continues to hold in this case.
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D Appendix-Proofs
D.1 Proof of Lemma 1
First, we will show that given a constricted good set S, reducing price of every good in S with the amount specified in the statement will increase the size of its neighbor, i.e., N (S). Given a constricted good set S under a specific price vector P. Consider another price vector
, where c := min i∈B\N (S),l∈S {max k∈M\S
For some j ∈ S, there must exists an i ∈ B \ N (S) satisfying v i,j − P j = max k∈M\S v i,k − P k . Now, by an abuse of notation to denote N (S) as the neighbor of S under P , i ∈ N (S). For those
Then, we need to prove that c is the minimum decrement. Consider another price vector
Consider another price vector P ,
Hence, no buyers will be added to the N (S). Now, it is clear that min i∈B\N (S),l∈S {max k∈M\S (v i,k − P k ) − (v i,l − P l )} is the minimum price reduction which guarantees to add at least a new buyer to the N (S).
D.2 Proof of Lemma 2
In order to prove the statement, we start from showing the most skewed set is always a constricted good set when there is no perfect matching. Then, we prove the uniqueness of the most skewed set by contradiction. When there is no perfect matching, there must exists a constricted good set. By definition, the constricted good set S has the property |S| > |N (S)|. Since |S|, |N (S)| are integers, the skewness of a constricted good set
Then, for any non-constricted good set S , |S | ≤ |N (S )|. The skewness of S is
With equation (11), (12) , the skewness of a constricted good set is always greater than any nonconstricted good sets. Therefore, if a preference graph exists a constricted good set, the most skewed set is always a constricted good set. Then, we start to prove the uniqueness of the most skewed set. Suppose there exists two disjoint sets S 1 , S 2 and both sets are the most skewed sets, i.e., f (S 1 ) = f (S 2 ) = max S⊂M,S =∅ f (S).
Consider the skewness of the union of S 1 and S 2 .
From (17) to (18) is true because S 2 is a constricted good set. (18) contradicts our assumption that S 1 , S 2 are the most skewed set. Therefore, we know that if there exists multiple sets share the same highest skewness value, these sets are not disjoint. Now, suppose there exists two sets S 1 , S 2 satisfying that S 1 ∪ S 2 = ∅ and both sets are the most skewed sets, the following two inequalities must hold:
Let's sum up the two inequalities and represent the formula in twelve terms.
The first four terms
Equation (24) is true because there may exist some elements in S 1 \S 2 and S 2 \S 1 but have common neighbors. Thus, the second four terms are smaller than or equal to 0. To check the last four terms, let |S 1 | = a, |S 2 | = b, and |S 1 ∩ S 2 | = c, where c < min{a, b} because S 1 , S 2 are not disjoint. The last four terms are 1
In case 4, define S = S * t+1 \ S * t , S = S * t \ S * t+1 , and T = S * t ∩ S * t+1 .
Most of the equations in case 4 are straight-forward except from (48) to (49).
(48) to (49) is true because of the following inequalities:
= |N t+1 (S ) \ N t (T )|
Combine these four cases, we know that
Therefore, we can conclude that the proposed algorithm terminates in finite rounds. (At most |M| 3 rounds because W (G) < |M| and minimum decrement is greater than 1 |M| 3 ).
D.4 Proof of Lemma 4
First, we want to show that suppose M g ∪ M b is a constricted good set, we can not include any good colored red to increase the skewness of the set. For any set of good colored red S r being added to M g ∪ M b , at least the same size of buyers being matched pairs of those red goods are join to N (M g ∪ M b ∪ S r ). Since we know that |N (S r ) \ N (M g ∪ M b )| ≥ |S r |, including any set of red goods will decrease the skewness of the set M g ∪ M b .
Then, we want to show remove any subset of goods S ⊆ M g ∪ M b will also reduce the skewness of the set. Clearly, removing any subset of blue good will not reduce N (M g ∪ M b ), hence blue goods are definitely included in the maximally skewed set. Therefore, we only need to consider the impact of removing set of green goods S ⊆ M g . Since for any S ⊆ M g , there has has at least one red edge connecting S and N (M g ∪ M b \ S) according to the algorithm, Hence, |N (M g ∪ M b )| − |N (M g ∪ M b \ S)| < |S|, which implies that removing any S ⊂ M g will only increase the skewness of the set. With these facts and the uniqueness property of the maximally skewed set, we can conclude that M g ∪ M b is the maximally skewed set.
D.5 Proof of Lemma 5
We will prove Algorithm 3 always return the most skewed set by contradiction. Since every untraversed good upon termination can be matched with an untraversed buyer without repetition. Therefore, adding any set of runtraversed goods S U to the set S will always reduce the skewness of S (because the increase of cardinality in neighbor of S, |N (S U )| − |N (S)| is always greater than or equal to the increase of cardinality of S, |S U | − |S|). Hence, the most skewed set will never contain any untraversed good. Suppose there exists a set S is the most skewed set, with a higher skewness than the set S return by Algorithm 3, S must be a subset of S because there's no untraversed good in the most skewed set and f (S ) > f (S). Let S * = S \ S , f (S ) > f (S) and S ⊂ S implies |N (S * ) \ N (S )| − |S * | > 0. If this happens, there must be a non-empty set of matching pairs match nodes from S * to N (S * ) \ N (S ) without repetition. Since N (S * ) \ N (S ) is not in N (S ) under the directed graph, nodes in S * will not be traversed in the algorithm contradicts that S * ⊂ S.
D.6 Proof of Theorem 1
First, let's begin with the proof of the first half statement of the theorem, which is a variational characterization of MCPs.
(⇒) This direction is obvious, otherwise the MCP is not the maximum by definition.
(⇐) Recall that M is the set of goods. Suppose there exists an MCP P 1 satisfying the conditions but it is not the maximum MCP. Then there must exist a set of goods S 1 such that for all i ∈ S 1 , P 1 i < P * i , and for all i ∈ M − S 1 , P 1 i ≥ P * i ; M − S 1 can be an empty set. Let P 2 i = P 1 i for all i ∈ M − S 1 , and P 2 i = P * i for all i ∈ S 1 . We will verify that P 2 is an MCP. WLOG, we can assume P 1 and P * have the same allocation; this is true as every MCP supports all efficient matchings. Then, consider any buyer who is assigned a good in S 1 under P * . When the price vector changes from P * to P 2 , the buyer has no profitable deviation from his/her assigned good because P 2 i ≥ P * i for all i and P 2 j = P * j for all j ∈ S 1 . Similarly, when the price vector changes from P 1 to P 2 , the buyer who is assigned a good in M \ S 1 under P 1 has no profitable deviation because P 2 i = P 1 i for all i ∈ M \ S 1 and P 2 j > P 1 j for all j ∈ S 1 . Finally, since P 1 and P * have the same allocation, no buyer will deviate if we assign this allocation to buyers under P 2 . Since all buyers have non-negative surpluses under P 2 , it follows that P 2 is an MCP.
Given P 1 , there exists a set of goods S 1 whose price we can increase and still get market clearing because both P 1 and P 2 are MCPs. This contradicts the assumption that P 1 satisfies the stated conditions, and the proof of the variational characterization follows.
For the second half part, which is a combinatorial characterization of MCPs, let's try to prove the statement using the result of the variational characterization. Given that we cannot increase the price for any subset of goods, it implies that for any subset of goods S, the set of corresponding matched buyer, either there exists at least one buyer has an edge connected to a good not in this subset or there exists at least one buyer with surplus zero. In the former case, it is obvious that B < N (B) for such corresponding buyer set B. In the later case, B ≤ N (B) and D ∈ N D (B) guarantees B < N D (B).
For the opposite direction, if every set of buyer with B < N D (B) under the current MCP, increasing the price for any set of good will make at least one corresponding buyer deviate from the matched good and cause no perfect matching. Therefore, the condition in variational characterization holds if and only if the condition in the combinatorial characterization holds.
